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CIUPPING AWAY AT THE ERISA SHIELD:
MANAGED CARE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CORPORATE
HEALTH INSURANCE, INC. V. TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
I. INTRODUCTION

Twenty-seven

years

ago

Congress

passed

the Employment

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),' the most significant

statute affecting private or employer health care financing in the United
States. ERISA was enacted in response to the great concern over
fraudulent and mismanaged pension and employee benefit plans.3 Yet,
Congress did not anticipate the impact that ERISA would have on
health care.
Ironically, Congress added the preemption clause, the most
controversial component, as a last minute committee compromise.4 The
preemption clause prevents states from enforcing statutes that "relate
to" an ERISA plan.' Thus, employer-provided health plans are legally
shielded from patients' negligence claims under state laws because
ERISA prevents state law application-arguably including tort actions.6
This has caused havoc in state and federal courts and has frustrated
individuals pursuing legal actions against their health care plan.
This Comment will discuss the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance,' which held
that a Texas law allowing individuals to sue their health insurance
carriers was not preempted by ERISA.8 Additionally, it will consider
recent Supreme Court and other federal circuit case law relating to
ERISA. It will also briefly address the state of managed care and some
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 418 (2d ed. 2000).
3. Id. at 419.
4. Id. at 418-19.
5. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
6. Wendy K. Mariner, What Recourse?-Liabilityfor Managed-Care Decisions and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592,592 (2000).
7. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, petitionfor cert. filed, 69
U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 24,2000) (No. 00-665).
8. Id. at 540.
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of the characteristics of HMOs and other managed care entities.9 Lastly,
this Comment will look at the environment surrounding the proposed
Patients' Bill of Rights and the subsequent pressure on Congress to
amend ERISA in order to provide individuals with more access to sue
their managed care provider. While Democrats and Republicans have
fought to pass their respective bills, a potential compromise and an
amendment to ERISA may be the most effective way to settle the
confusion surrounding ERISA preemption.
This Comment concludes that despite the Fifth Circuit decision,
managed care entities will remain protected by the ERISA shield. This
is primarily because it remains too easy for managed care organizations
to categorize their decisions as exclusively eligibility based decisions,
which are preempted by ERISA, rather than treatment decisions, which
are not preempted by ERISA. Additionally, it remains unclear to what
extent courts will permit all mixed eligibility/treatment decisions to not
be preempted by ERISA. Further, it seems unlikely that statutes will
successfully find a way to circumvent ERISA with respect to
independent review provisions. It is ultimately up to Congress to find a
way to work in a bipartisan fashion to craft a Patients' Bill of Rights that
will amend ERISA, giving individuals more opportunity to seek redress
and independent review for harm and other conflicts caused by their
managed care organizations.
II. ERISA AND THE PREMPTION CLAUSE

The goal of ERISA is to provide uniform administration of
employee pension and health plans, thus preventing situations that in
the past had left thousands of employees without earned retirement
benefits." By enacting ERISA, Congress hoped to simplify employee
benefit administration by preventing plan administrators from having to
work with numerous types of state laws." In this respect, employers and
9. HMO is an acronym for "Health Maintenance Organization." It is one type of
managed care entity. The term "managed care entity" will be used throughout this Comment
as a broad term to encompass the different types of managed care entities available to
consumers.
10. See FURROW, supra note 2, at 419.
11. See Robert L. Roth, Recent Developments Concerning the Effect of ERISA
Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan Administrators,
Managed Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, HEALTH LAW., Early Spring 1996, at
3. ERISA does not cover a number of other health insurance plans. See FURROW, supra
note 2, at 420. These include state, federal, or local government sponsored plans, as well as
those set up by church organizations, and "plans maintained solely to comply with state
workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, or disability insurance requirements."
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other plan sponsors, acting under ERISA, have greater flexibility to
determine plan provisions." "By enacting ERISA, Congress shielded
qualifying ERISA plans from inconsistent state regulatory schemes that
could increase inefficiency and potentially cause benefit levels to be
reduced by diverting3 available benefit dollars to satisfy additional
administrative costs."'
Through ERISA, multi-state employers can provide uniform plan4
coverage without addressing each state's health insurance statutes.'
Prior to ERISA, many states had mandated benefit laws that specified
the types of procedures and conditions that health plans were required
to cover in that particular state. If one employer operated in thirty
different states, it would have to provide a different health care package
for employees in each of those states. 6 With ERISA, however,
Congress preempted state laws regarding employee benefit plans, and
therefore allowed employers to formulate a nationwide benefit plan."
ERISA created not only uniformity of operation, but also uniformity
with respect to the remedies available to persons who were denied
health insurance or certain benefits associated with their plan." Under
section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, an individual can assert a civil claim to
recover benefits under the plan, enforce rights under the plan, or clarify
Thus, ERISA plan
rights for future benefits under the plan.
is a dispute over
if
there
court
in
federal
plan
sue
their
can
participants
benefits and further, the participant may obtain an injunction against
the plan and receive attorney's fees.? These are the only remedies
available to an ERISA plan participant.2' ERISA displaces state law
claims such as a bad-faith denial of benefits, and as a result, there is no
Id. Despite these exemptions, ERISA plans are the largest source of payment for health care
services in the United States. Id. at 436. More than seventy-five percent of all managed care
plans in the United States fall under ERISA's grasp. ld.
12. See Roth, supranote 11, at 3.

13. Id.
14. DEAN M. HARRIS, HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS-IsSUES FOR THE AGE OF

MANAGED CARE 285 (1999).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

I& Id.
19. FURROW, supra note 2, at 436 (quoting Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption
Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of JudicialLaw-CreatingAuthority, 46
FLA. L. REv. 355 (1994)).
20. HARRIS, supra note 14, at 285.
21. Id.
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chance to recover punitive damages or damages associated with pain
and suffering arising from the denial of benefits.'
While ERISA regulates pensions, it has a deregulatory effect on
health insurance.' It imposes minimal conditions on employee benefit
plans, and thus, provides few remedies for employees who are ill-served
by their health plans.24 Further, "ERISA preempts a wide range of state
laws and remedies intended to protect health plan beneficiaries, often
leaving beneficiaries wholly stripped of legal protection from health
plan abuses. "2 Once in federal court, "the most plaintiffs can recover is
the cost of the care denied them. "26
ERISA's language is principally directed at retirement benefits,' but
its effect on employer-provided welfare benefits, and thus health
insurance, has been very significant.2 "ERISA governs participation,
funding, and vesting requirements on EBPs [(Employee Benefit Plans)]
and sets uniform standards regarding reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
responsibilities, rather than regulating the content of EBPs."21
The "relate to" preemption language in the statute is broader than
either the House or Senate contemplated when ERISA was drafted.3
As a result, individuals under an ERISA plan are limited to the
remedies, benefits, and enforcement of rights outlined in that specific
plan. 31 Hence, "[n]o punitive or extracontractual damages are allowed
[and] suits for wrongful death, personal injury, or other claims for
consequential damages caused by improper refusal of care or coverage
by an insurer or utilization reviewer are preempted because they pray
for relief not enumerated in the statute." 32 Therefore, ERISA greatly
restricts the amount of damages available to a plaintiff in what would

22. Id.; see infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing remedies available to
ERISA participants that do not relate to benefit determinations).
23. FURROW, supra note 2, at 419.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Linda A. Johnson, Parents Sue HMO in Baby's Death: N.J. Case Seen as Potential
Precedent in Insurer'sAccountability, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,2000, at A2.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
28. Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA and Managed Care: The Law Abhors a Vacuum, 29 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 268,268 (1996).
29. BRYAN A. LIANG, HEALTH LAW & POLICY 76 (2000) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
30. FURROW, supra note 2, at 424 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-100).
31. LIANG, supra note 29, at 81-82 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West 1999)).
32. Id. at 82 (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3)).
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typically be described as a malpractice case.33 Due to ERISA
preemption, a defendant can remove a malpractice suit to federal court,
thus making it an ERISA claim rather than an ordinary malpractice
case.M In doing this, the defendant vastly restricts the scope of potential
financial liability. 5
National uniformity occurs through a provision of ERISA section
514(a), which states that it "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they.., relate to any employee benefit plan."36 Three
statutory clauses expand upon this provision.
First, under the preemption clause, ERISA preempts a state law if it
relates to an employee benefit plan that is regulated by ERISA3 In
other words, a state law claim for a wrongful denial of benefits is
preempted, and the individual is limited to the remedy provided by the
ERISA statute.3 9
Second, the "savings clause" exempts insurance, banking, and
security state laws from preemption.' Thus, the insurance industry,
traditionally regulated by the states, is not preempted by ERISA. 4 A
state, however, may indirectly regulate an ERISA plan through
regulations that cover the insurance plan that establishes the ERISA
plan. 42
The final clause, the "deemer clause," however, is an exception to
the "savings clause," in that state insurance laws may not regulate selfinsured ERISA plans. 43 Companies may choose to self-insure
themselves rather than seek out other health insurance coverage. These
employers are regulated by ERISA and are not "deemed" insurance
companies under ERISA, so state law remains inapplicable to these
plans.
Some differences arise between insured and self-insured ERISA

33. FURROW, supra note 2, at 436.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp V 1999).

37. Farrell, supranote 28, at 269.
38. Id.
39. HARRIS, supra note 14, at 288.

40. Roth, supranote 11, at 3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
41. See HARRIS, supranote 14, at 289.
42- Id. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text for a more complete explanation of

this fact.
43. FURROW, supra note 2, at 430; see also Farrell, supra note 28, at 269; Roth, supra

note 11, at 3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)).
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plans." State laws that mandate certain health benefits will indirectly
apply to ERISA plans that purchase insurance in that state.45 They do
not, however, apply to self-insured ERISA plans. 6 An example of this
type of state law is one that requires health insurance companies to
authorize inpatient care coverage for new mothers following normal or
Caesarean delivery.' If a particular state has this law and an ERISA
plan has purchased insurance there, then it must provide that care. 4s A
self-insured plan, however, does not have to follow this mandatory state
law.49 This particular and problematic discrepancy was remedied when
Congress passed a federal statute not preempted by ERISA that
prevented the existence of these so-called "drive-through deliveries" in
both types of ERISA plans. 0
Determining whether a state law is preempted by ERISA typically
involves a three-step inquiry."s First, does the law "relate to" an ERISA
plan?52 Second, is it protected from preemption by existing as a law that
regulates insurance, banking, or securities?53 Finally, is the particular
plan at issue self-insured and thereby excluded from state insurance
laws?" The first step, which is the focus of this Comment, has caused
the most problems for federal courts in their analysis of ERISA claims.
III. FEDERAL COURT CASE LAW SINCE THE INCEPTION OF ERISA
The Supreme Court has wrestled with ERISA's language, and the

lower courts' conflicting interpretations since its adoption.55 The Court
has even gone so far as to comment that section 514 is "not a model of
legislative drafting."56 When ERISA's preemption language was first
considered, the Court broadly interpreted it.57 In Shaw v. Delta Air
44. HARRIS, supra note 14, at 289.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. FURROW, supra note 2, at 421 (discussing how the three-step inquiry is used in
varying degrees by most, but not all, courts).
52. Roth, supra note 11, at 3.
53. Id.
54. See Farrell, supra note 28, at 270.
55. See FURROW, supra note 2, at 424 (citing seventeen cases that the Court has decided
attempting to resolve ERISA confusion through 1999).
56. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,739 (1985).
57. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96, 98 (1983).
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Lines, Inc.,- the Court considered a New York law that made it

unlawful to discriminate on the basis of pregnancy in an employee
benefit plan. It gave a broad definition to the "relates to" language by
holding that a law is preempted if it has a "connection with or reference
to" an ERISA plan.59 The Court continued to apply this broad analysis
to every ERISA implicated situation for over a decade. 60 As a result of
this wide preemption scope, courts interpreted state statutes and tort or
contract causes of action to "'relate[] to' an employee plan if it expressly
referred to ERISA plans, or was essentially a claim for plan benefits, a
claim of improper administration of the plan, a claim that depended on
the existence of an ERISA61plan, or a claim that affected the provision of
benefits under [the] plan.1
The Court finally considered limiting the wide scope of preemption
in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.(' It determined that the "relate to" language in
ERISA section 514(a) was unclear, and therefore, it was necessary to
look beyond the text to Congressional intent. 3 Congress's objective in
this instance was to reduce inter-state conflict and provide uniform
distribution of employment benefits law.6' The Court realized that,
while the "relates to" language was broad, it contained limits and held
that ERISA did not preempt a New York law that forced hospitals to
differentially charge insured, HMO, or self-insured plans.5 Also of
importance to the context of this Comment, the Court noted that
"nothing in the language of [ERISA] or [in] the context of its passage
indicate[d] that Congress chose to displace general health care
regulation, which historically has been a matter of local concern."66
58. Id. at 88.

59. Id. at 96-97.
60. FURROW, supra note 2, at 425.
61. Farrell, supra note 28, at 269 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
486 U.S. 825 (1988); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125,130-31
(1992); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Settles v. Golden
Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1991); Dearmas v. Av-Med. Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.
Fla. 1994); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990); Ricci v. Gooberman,
840 F. Supp. 316,317 (D.NJ. 1993); Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp.
39,43 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd on other grounds,57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995)).
62. 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995).
63. Id. at 656.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 654, 667-68.
66. Id. at 661. The Fifth Circuit used similar reasoning in CorporateHealth Insurance,
Inc v. Texas Department of Insurance, 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000). See infra notes 133-34,
138-39 and accompanying text.
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Since Travelers, the Supreme Court has appeared less stringent in its
preemption analysis. 67 For instance, prior to Travelers, the Court rarely
accepted a state's rationale for a particular law, and after Travelers, the
Court has denied preemption claims in half of the cases.6' The primary
thrust of the Court's most recent discussions of ERISA preemption
focused upon "the traditional importance of the area of regulation to
the state and the purposes of ERISA in determining whether a legal
claim or requirement was preempted by ERISA."69
This more liberal analysis was apparent in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical & ClinicalServices Fund,0 in which the Court held that a New
York law could legally impose a tax on hospitals operated by ERISA
plans. The Court stated that the law was one of "general applicability
that impose[s] some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans" but
was not preempted by the "relate to" language in ERISA.7 ' Such taxes
and other laws may increase the cost of providing an ERISA plan or
effect the administration of it, but that cannot cause every state law to
fall in the face of ERISA preemption. 7' Further, in a concurring opinion
in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, Inc.,73 Justice Scalia reproached the Court for not
acknowledging in its opinion that the holdings of older cases in this area
have been "abandoned." 74
Despite this, however, in January 2000, the Supreme Court held in
Pegram v. Herdrich75 that the plaintiff's claim against her health care
plan, based on the use of the plan's physician incentives, was preempted
by ERISA. The plaintiff, Cynthia Herdrich, sued the plan because she
claimed that her physicians denied her necessary care in order to save
money and take advantage of the HMO's incentive system.76 She argued

67. See FURROW, supranote 2, at 424, 427. Four cases decided following Travelers were
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., 519
U.S. 316 (1997), DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806
(1997), Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997), and UNUM Life Insurance, Co. v. Ward, 526
U.S. 358 (1999). See FURROW, supra note 2, at 424 n.5.
68. FURROW, supra note 2, at 427.
69. Id.
70. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 807,816.
71. Id. at 815.
72. Id. at 816.
73. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
74. Id. at 335.
75. 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
76. Id. at 216; see infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
these incentive plans).
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that her HMO violated its ERISA fiduciary duty,? The Supreme Court
found for the defendant HMO, concluding that it was not an ERISA
plan and thus not subject to ERISA fiduciary provisions.' The origin of
ERISA's fiduciary duties arises from the common law of trusts and thus,
relates to managing assets and property.79 The Court concluded that
Congress did not intend for an HMO to be treated as a fiduciary when it
makes mixed eligibility decisions through its physicians.'
Because the defense of any HMO of a mixed decision would be
that its physician acted for good medical reasons, the plausibility
of which would require reference to traditional standards of
reasonable medical practice... the Court was concerned that a
decision to view a mixed decision as an act of ERISA fiduciary
duty would "federalize malpractice litigation.""'
Perhaps in response to the Supreme Court's willingness to bend the
preemption language, various federal circuits have allowed patients to
sue their managed care organizations.' In those cases, the courts
allowed suits where the individual's doctor was negligent in the
administration of care and the doctor acted as an agent for the managed
care organization.8 State law covers negligence suits concerning
corporate liability for the acts of their corporate employees (i.e., agents)
pursuant to agency law.m The courts reasoned that the physicians were
making decisions regarding the quality of care and that, by itself, does
not "relate to" an ERISA plan.' In turn, this concept permits medical
malpractice claims to be brought in state court even when the plaintiff
belongs to an ERISA plan." Most doctors, however, are not employees
of managed care organizations, and thus encumber nearly the entire

77. Pegram,530 U.S. at 216.

78. Id. at 226-27.
79. Id. at 231-32.
80. Id. at 232. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing Pegram and its
implications for future cases).
81. Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235-36).
82. Mariner, supra note 6, at 592 (citing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.2d 350 (3d
Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Rice v. Panchal,

65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. Id.
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medical malpractice claim load." Finally, "[t]he Second, Third, and
Seventh Circuits have held that medical negligence claims against
HMOs for vicarious and direct liability are not... completely
preempted because they involve conduct by the HMO in its capacity as
a provider and arranger of health services and not as plan
administrator. "
IV.

THE STATE OF MANAGED CARE

The feverishly controversial environment surrounding ERISA is a
result of the public outcry regarding the state of managed care. As it
stands right now, ERISA acts as a shield to HMOs' that have been
accused of being more concerned with saving money than providing
quality care. Thus, doctors who may prescribe a certain type of care are
barred from doing so because their patient's managed care organization
refuses to authorize it. When the patient is adversely affected and
covered by an ERISA plan, they have little or no legal redress. Two
cases are illustrative of this misfortune. In Fox v. Health Net 0 the
plaintiff, who was not a beneficiary of an ERISA plan, was awarded $89
million dollars against the HMO after it failed to cover a bone marrow
transplant for metastatic breast cancer. In a similar case, Spain v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co.,9 a patient, who was covered under an ERISA plan,
died after an extensive authorization delay for a bone marrow
transplant, and his survivors could not recover any compensatory or
punitive damages from the HMO. This discrepancy illustrates the
problems associated with ERISA. Frustration with ERISA, however, is
partially a result of patients' distrust of and dissatisfaction with their
managed care plans.2
87. Id.; see also Dionne Koller Fine, Exploitation of the Elite: A Case for Physician
Unionization, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 207 (2001) (discussing the negative impact of managed
care organizations on physicians and introducing the possibility of collective bargaining
between physicians and managed care organizations).
88. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526,535 n.25 (2000).
89. See infra pp. 111-13 for a discussion of the meaning of "HMO" and other managed
care organizations.
90. No. 219629, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993); see also
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 286.
91. 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also HARRIS, supra note 14, at 286.
92. A recent survey reported that 46% of those surveyed believed that HMOs were
doing a bad job, while that number was reported at 25% in a similar survey conducted in
1997. See Bill Brubaker, Dissatisfactionwith HMOs Increasing,Survey Shows, WASH. POST,
Aug. 31, 2001, at El. Consumer complaints were primarily a result of insurance bills and
claims, coverage issues, and disappointment over the amount of access to doctors. Id.
Despite those numbers, 62% of people still gave their plans a grade of an A or B. Id. Also,
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Managed care organizations (MCOs)' arose in an era when health
care premiums were increasing at annual rates of seventeen and twentyone percent in 1988 and 1989 respectively. 94 Thus, MCOs strove to
reduce costs and provide the best value for both the payer and the
patient.95 The theory of managed care is distinct from "fee-for-service"
medicine because it concentrates all the coordinated responsibilities
surrounding financing and discharge of care in one place, rather than in
multiple arenas like the former, more expensive system.96
The giant managed care organization that most people group into
the term "HMO" actually began with a rather simplistic structureY At
the outset, the administrators of an HMO contracted with a group of
physicians to whom the HMO promised to include on its list of
physicians that could be chosen by the HMO's health plan members.'
In exchange for this automatic referral service, the physicians charged
lower rates for HMO membersY HMO members chose among a list of
various types of physicians that they could go to under their plan.
Patient dissatisfaction with a restricted number of physicians to choose
from resulted in the development of Point of Service (POS) plans, which
allow an individual, willing to pay a higher premium, to go beyond the
specifications of the original health planY)°
An HMO may act as both the provider and the insurer.' There are
two main types of HMOsY 2 The first type directly hires physicians to
work out of its facilities (the staff model), and the second type contracts
with physician groups to provide health care at discounted rates (the
group model). 3 Most consider staff model HMOs to be providers,
80% of those who had contact with their plans commented that it was a positive experience.
Id. Administrators of managed care entities report that they believe that the "public's view of
the industry is shaped largely by HMO-bashing politicians." Id.
93. Managed Care Organization (MCO) is a broad category of health plans, ranging
from simple pre-authorization plans to HMOs. BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW

308 (1995).
94. Peggy L. Noble, Comment, The Mismanagement of Managed Care Legislation: A
Comparison Between the Democratic-ProposedPatients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 and the
Republican-ProposedPatientProtectionAct of 1998,28 CAP. U. L. REv. 685,689 (2000).
95. FURROW, supra note 93, at 308.
96. Id. at 308-09.
97. Noble, supranote 94, at 689.
98. Id. at 689-90.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 690.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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whereas the group model primarily exists only as an insurer."' Two
types of managed care models include preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) and POS plans."0 5 A PPO is the most common type of managed
care plan that establishes "a network of preferred providers who agree
to give medical services at discounted rates."'06 Further, an independent
practice association (IPA) is made up of physicians organized as a
partnership or corporation.'0 7 The HMO contracts with IPAs, individual
physicians, or both to deliver medical care at physician-provided
facilities.' ° In most MCOs, one physician acts as the manager for one
patient's health care services." 9 Thus, this can include a referral to other
physicians, like specialists, in needed circumstances."'
HMOs or other types of MCOs primarily use two ways to encourage
physicians to engage in "cost-conscious decision making.""' With
"capitation," the physician receives a lump sum of money for each
patient, irrespective of the individual's needs and the cost of the
individual's treatment.12 The second type, "salary," exists when an
HMO hires a group of physicians as employees or contracts with a
physician group, and each physician receives a salary for providing
health care to a group of individuals in a particular health plan."3 Both
of these payment plans discourage physicians from spending more time
with their patients because there is no additional compensation
available for doing so."14 Further, "use of ancillary health care services
104. See id. This difference is central to the liability issues at stake with respect to
managed care entities, because risk can be more easily diverted in the group model. See id.
The Texas Health Care Liability Act would make both models more vulnerable to civil
liability suits. Kristin M. McCabe, Note, The Texas Health Care Liability Act: Texas is the
First State to Listen to the Concerns of Its Health Care Consumers, but How Much has It
Heard?, 16 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 565, 583-84 (2000); TEX.Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
105. Christine Lockhart, The Safest Care is to Deny Care: Implications of Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance on HMO Liability in Texas, 41 S.
TEx. L. REV. 621, 626 (2000).
106. Id. at 628.
107. Id. at 627.
108. Id.
109. See Patricia Mullen Ochmann, Managed Care Organizations Manage to Escape
Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead to ERISA's Inequitable Preemption of
Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571, 576-77 (2001).
110. See id.
111. Robert J. Herrington, Note, Herdrich v. Pegram: ERISA Fiduciary Liability and
Physician Incentives to Deny Care, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 715,718 (2000).
112- Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. For example, salaried physicians may spend more time with their patients
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like diagnostic tests, referrals, and experimental treatments" are not
encouraged since there is often a certain amount of money set aside for
these services, and anything left over goes to the physician as a bonus. 5
These and other practices aimed at curbing costs, rather than improving
patient care, led to legislative action in Texas.
V. THE CHALLENGE TO THE TEXAS HEALTH CARE LIABILITY ACT

A. The Texas Health Care Liability Act
The Texas Health Care Liability Act (Act) 6 represents the first time7
that a state passed a law allowing malpractice suits against HMOs.
The expansion of the managed care industry prompted concern that
insurance administrators, rather than physicians, were making the
instrumental decisions regarding a patient's health care."' Employer
groups and HMOs opposed the bill, asserting that it would increase
health care costs."9 In contrast, the Texas Medical Association fully
supported the bill because it requires medical decisions to be made by
doctors rather than HMOs.'2"
The Act imposes two duties upon HMOs and provides that patients
may sue their HMOs for breaches of either of these duties.'21 First, if an
individual's health insurance carrier, HMO, or other managed care
entity fails to exercise ordinary care when making a health care
treatment decision, then the individual can sue for damages proximately
caused by this failurel " Second, these managed care entities may be
liable for damages resulting from a health care treatment decision made

because their income is fixed, whereas fee-for-service physicians may be more inclined to
rush, because the more patients they visit, the more money they make. Id.
115. Id. at 718-19. This type of physician incentive system was the issue at stake in
Pegram v. Herdrich,530 U.S. 211 (2000).
116. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
117. McCabe, supra note 104, at 581. California, New York, and Ohio all have bills
pending in their legislatures that are analogous to the Texas Health Care Liability Act and
approximately seventeen more states are considering a similar law. Christine E. Brasel,
Comment, Managed Care Liability: State Legislation May Arm Angry Members with Legal
Ammo to Fire at Their MCOs for Cost Containment Tactics... But Could It Backfire?, 27
CAP. U. L. REv. 449,458 (1999).
118. McCabe, supranote 104, at 582.
119. Id. at 582-83.
120. Id. at 583.
121. Id.
122. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (citing TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
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by an employee, agent, or representative.'3 Additionally, the Act
"establishes an independent review process for adverse benefit
determinations and requires an insured or enrollee to submit his or her
claim challenging an adverse benefit determination to a review by an
independent review organization if such a review is requested by the
managed care entity." 24

B. Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance
Plaintiffs, Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., Aetna Health Plans of
Texas, Inc., Aetna Health Plans of North Texas, Inc., and Aetna Life
Insurance Co., brought an action against defendants, Texas Department
of Insurance, the Commissioner of the Texas Department of Insurance
and the Texas Attorney General, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. 1" In anticipation of the effect that the Act would have on
managed care entities, the plaintiffs filed suit immediately after the Act
went into effect on May 22, 1997.26 They sought a declaration that the
Act was preempted by ERISA and an injunction barring enforcement of
the Act as it relates to ERISA plans.'27
Defendants argued that the Act regulated quality of care provided
by managed care entities, while ERISA "governs what types of
regulations may be placed on an employee benefit plan." " ' Further, the
purpose of the Act was to make managed care entities accountable "for
the medical decisions they 'make,' 'control' or 'influence. '" 29 The Act
"does not seek to regulate how HMO's make benefit or coverage
determinations; nor does it proscribe requirements governing the
structure of a benefit plan.
Accordingly, the ERISA... preemption
13
'
apply.
not
do[es]
clause[]
Conversely, plaintiffs argued that the Act interferes with ERISA's
objectives, and thus, inserts "state law into an area exclusively reserved
for Congress."'' They further argued that the Act largely related to
ERISA "because it purports to impose state law liability on ERISA
entities and... mandate[s] the structure of plan benefits and...
123. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(b)).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 602-03 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003(c)).
Id at 602.
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2000).
CorporateHealth, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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administration .... [Further, it] wrongfully binds employers and plan
administrators to particular choices and impermissibly creates an
alternat[ive] enforcement mechanism." 132

The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the preemption issue as it relates to four distinct portions of the Act. 33
The District Court found the liability portions of the Act were not
preempted by ERISA, while in contrast, the court found the antiretaliation, anti-indemnification, and independent review provisions
were subsumed by ERISA preemption."

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals partially disagreed
and held only the independent review provisions to be preempted by
ERISA.13' The court first addressed the liability provision by
distinguishing managed care entities that function as plan administrators
from entities that function as medical care providers.3 A state cannot
regulate managed care entities when they function as plan
administrators, but state regulation may inhere where the entities act as
medical care providers. 37 "ERISA preempts malpractice suits against
doctors making coverage decisions in the administration of a plan, but it
does not insulate physicians from accountability to their state licensing
agency or association charged to enforce professional standards
regarding medical decisions."' 1 The court believed that this ensures
finer medical standards and that Congress could not have meant to
preempt
state laws regarding the quality and accountability of medical
13 9
care.
Additionally, the court concluded that the liability provisions are not
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526,540 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 532.
Id. at 540.
l at 534. The liability provision states:

A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care
entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making
health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an insured or
enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001). The Act also defines
"health care treatment decision": "[A] determination made when medical services are
actually provided by the health care plan and a decision which affects the quality of the
diagnosis, care, or treatment provided to the plan's insureds or enrollees." Id. § 88.001(5).
137. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 534 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482

U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
138. Id. at 534-35.

139. Id. at 535.
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preempted by "referring to" ERISA plans."4 This portion of the
preemption analysis determines whether the Act applies impartially to
all types of plans, including ERISA plans. 41 Since the Act applies
independently of the individual's type of plan, it does not "relate to" an
ERISA plan. 42 Thus, the liability provisions are simply a part of the
state's police powers to ensure the quality of Texas health care.'43 It
makes no difference that the patient's services were paid for by an
ERISA plan and arranged by a managed care entity, because medical
standards of care fall under a state's regulatory power.M
Next, the court discussed the anti-retaliation and antiindemnification provisions of the Act.'45 The anti-retaliation provision
prevents a managed care entity from penalizing a doctor or health care
provider for "advocating medically necessary treatment. ''4' "The anti-

indemnification provision prohibits a managed care entity from
including an indemnification clause in its contracts with doctors and
other health care providers that would hold it harmless for its own
acts."'1 47 The court was not persuaded that these provisions forced the
insurer to provide a certain level of coverage, something preempted by
ERISA.'4 Instead, "[t]he liability and indemnity provisions force...
managed care entit[ies]" to assume the same interests as doctors do in
providing quality care to patients, because the entities will share the
possible "risk of tort liability."149 Further, the anti-retaliation provision
prevents the situation whereby a physician would be forced to choose
between the patient and the managed care entity."50 Finally, the court
expressed hope that the liability and indemnity provisions of the Act
would promote the autonomy of5 the physician, despite managed care
entities' need to be cost efficient.1 1
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
519 U.S. 316, 322 (1997)).
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 535-36 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(f) (Vernon
Supp. 2001)).
147. Id. at 536 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(g)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court further states that "[s]uch a scheme is again the kind of quality of
care regulation that has been left to the states." Id. "In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Court held
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The final parts of the statute that the court analyzed were those
provisions that permitted individuals to appeal determinations made by
their managed care entity." There were two types of these provisions.
The first allowed independent review of claims for which plan members
may later sue under the liability provisions. 53 The court concluded that
these provisions cannot be preempted by ERISA because "[a]ny duty
imposed on managed care entities by the independent review provisions
' 14
extends no further than that imposed by the liability provisions."
Further, this review procedure was made voluntary by 1999
amendments to the Act."5 Thus, the managed care entity had a difficult
argument with respect to ERISA preemption where they were not
mandated to carry out the review."
The court concluded that the second set of provisions, which allow
patients to appeal "adverse determinations" regarding coverage, do fall
An "adverse
within the breadth of ERISA preemption."s
determination" may derive from a physician's decision or the coverage
in the plan."s In such a case, a patient is allowed to go to an outside
organization for an appeal and review, and "[s]uch an attempt to impose
a state administrative regime governing coverage determinations is
squarely within the ambit of ERISA's preemptive reach."5 9 In the
instant case, the court rebutted the argument made by defendants that
this independent review provision fell under the ERISA savings clause
exception that exempts state laws regulating insurance' ° The "quasi-

that ERISA confers no cause of action against HMOs for providing incentives to their
doctors for limiting the costs of testing and treatment. Part of the Court's reasoning was that

states are currently allowed to impose malpractice liability on HMOs for such action." Id. at
536 n.34 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000)).
152. Id. at 536 n.35 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003 (Vernon
Supp. 2001)).
153. Id. A patient can only sue their managed care entity after they have gone through
the independent review procedure. Id.
154. Id. at 536-37.
155. Id. at 537.
156. Id.
157. Id. An "adverse determination" is "a determination by [an HMO] or utilization
review agent that the health care services furnished or proposed to be furnished to an
enrollee are not medically necessary [or inappropriate]." TEX. INS. CODE § 20A.12A (a)
(Vernon Supp. 2001).
158. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 537.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 537, 539. The Seventh Circuit disagrees on this point in Moran v. Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). See infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
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administrative procedure" created by the Act forced the ERISA plan
administrators to comply with the decision of the independent review
organization respecting the denial of benefits."' "This scheme creates
an alternative mechanism through which plan members may seek
benefits due them under the terms of the plan-the identical relief
offered under... ERISA... [and, therefore,] the independent review
provisions conflict with ERISA's exclusive remedy and cannot be saved
by the saving[s] clause."' 62 As a result of the court's finding, this portion
of the Act was severed from the remainder because it was the only
provision found preempted by ERISA.'6'
C. Implications of the Corporate Health Decision
It is difficult to predict how much of an impact the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Corporate Health will have in Texas and what sort of
influence it may carry to other state legislatures and federal circuit
courts. In Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,'6' a recent decision
from the Seventh Circuit, the court directly disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in CorporateHealth. At issue in Moran was an Illinois
statute that required independent physician review in cases where a
patient's primary physician disagreed with the patient's HMO regarding
medically necessary treatment; unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit found that the independent review provision was not preempted
The court held that the independent review provisions
by ERISA.'
were covered under the savings clause in ERISA, which exempts state
laws that regulate insurance. 6 The court found that the Illinois statute
"relates to" ERISA but is nonetheless saved through its regulatory
effect on insurance.' 67 Additionally, the court noted the intra-circuit
conflict, but stated that the Illinois statute does not change or alter the
relief contained within ERISA, since the independent review provisions
became a part of the plaintiff's insurance contract through the statute's
Further, the Illinois statute did not provide an
implementation.'6
161. CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 539.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 539-40. In response to the Fifth Circuit Corporate Health case, the United
States Supreme Court has asked the Solicitor General for a brief articulating the stance of the
United States. See Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 148 L. Ed. 2d 657 (2001).
164. 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 971-72.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 969.
168. Id. at 972 & n.7.
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alternative remedy to recover benefits, but acted as an additional
internal mechanism when coverage disputes arose.69
The court in Moran did not consider the recent Supreme Court
decision in Pegram, a fact noted by the dissent.'
The Moran court's
analysis centered upon the savings clause, 71 whereas the Corporate
Health court's analysis was partially based on the principles discussed in
Pegram.Y Unlike Moran, the CorporateHealth decision suggested that
an analysis of claims under ERISA was case specific, and that this was
due to the particular treatment/eligibility decisions made in each
patient's case."
The Supreme Court in Pegram distinguished between "treatment"
decisions and "eligibility" decisions. 74 Eligibility decisions are based on
a patient's health insurance coverage under the patient's specific plan
and are preempted by ERISA, whereas treatment decisions are not
preempted because they have to do with diagnostic decisions made by a
physician based upon an examination of the patient.' 75 Further, the
Supreme Court in Pegram held that "mixed" treatment and eligibility
decisions did not establish an ERISA cause of action for a breach of
fiduciary duty.7 6 The Court did not make clear whether these "mixed"
decisions, since they were only partially related to a patient's treatment,
would always survive ERISA preemption and thus be subject to state
tort law. Perhaps as long as the decision contains some relation to
"treatment" and is not entirely based on "eligibility," the decision will
not be preempted by ERISA 78
Thus, before a plaintiff may sue a managed care entity under the
Texas Health Care Liability Act, a court must determine whether a
decision is based on "treatment" or "eligibility." This distinction is far
less clear in the context of real life decision making between a patient, a

169. Id. at 971-72.
170. Id. at 974.
171. See supranote 166.
172. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641,643-44 (5th Cir.

2000).
173. See id. at 643.
174. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000).

175. Id.
176. See id. at 229-30.
177. See Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089,1097 (Pa. 2001) (Saylor, J.,
dissenting). See

also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 654
(4th ed. 2001).
178. FURROW FT AL., supranote 177, at 654.
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physician, and the managed care entity.'79 The Court acknowledged this
0 For example, in Pegram, the physician determined
fact in Pegram."
that Herdrich's condition was not severe enough to require immediate
treatment."' Thus, the HMO involved there, Carle, would not cover the
care." Carle would, however, have covered the emergency care if Dr.
Pegram had decided that her patient, Herdrich, did need the
appendectomy.'
The interdependency of this decision making
anticipates the difficulty in clearly distinguishing between treatment and
eligibility decisions.'"
In another case, Pappas v. Asbel,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that ERISA did not preempt state law medical malpractice claims.
Pappas, the plaintiff, was admitted to the hospital at 11:00 a.m.
"complaining of paralysis and numbness in his extremities."'
The
emergency room physician consulted with the neurologists on staff, and
they collectively determined that Pappas needed emergency
neurological treatment and should be transferred to a second hospital.'"
The ambulance arrived at 12:40 p.m. but Pappas's health care provider
denied authorization for treatment at the second hospital." After
numerous phone calls, the health care provider authorized transfer to
the second hospital at 3:30 p.m."' The delay allegedly caused Pappas's
permanent quadriplegia.' 9 Pappas sued his primary care physician and
the hospital,9 ' and the defendants filed a third party claim against
Pappas's health care plan.' 9
The court in Pappas concluded that there was no ERISA
preemption because negligence claims against an HMO did not "relate
179. See Thomas R. McClean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for
Breach of FiduciaryDuty after Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemptionfor State
Law Liabilityfor Medical CareDecisionMaking, 53 FLA. L. REv. 1, 27 (2001).
180. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See McCabe, supra note 104, at 593-95 (noting the distinction between "quality"
and "quantity" of benefits discussed in the district court's opinion in Corporate Health Ins.,
Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998)).
185. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998).
186. Id. at 890.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192 Id.
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to" an ERISA plan. 93 It noted that the Supreme Court has yet to
determine whether state law negligence claims "relate to" an ERISA
plan." ' Based on the Court's narrowing of its "relate to" preemption
analysis as well as its reading of the Travelers case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that the state law negligence claims were
not preempted by ERISA.' 9' In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice
Nigro's concurring opinion indicated that the key issue should be
whether the state law claims refer to the "quantum" of benefits or the
"quality" of benefits.'96 State law may regulate the "quality" of benefits
but not the "quantum" of benefits.1' 9 In other words, negligent medical
decisions can surpass summary judgment, but negligent coverage
decisions are quickly preempted by ERISA.
The United States Supreme Court vacated this decision without a
reason and remanded it to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
reevaluate it in light of Pegram.'9 On remand, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed its original decision. 99 The court concluded
that the decision in this case involved a mixed eligibility and treatment
decision.m Dr. Leibowtiz not only decided whether Pappas's condition
was covered, which it was, but he also determined when and where the
condition should be treated."' Since this was a "mixed decision," "the
adverse consequences of which, if any, are properly redressed, as
Pegram teaches, through state medical malpractice law. "202
Both Pappas
and Pegram involve factual situations that seem to draw tenuous lines
between those eligibility decisions that are preempted by ERISA and
those treatment decisions that are not. The Fifth Circuit in Corporate
Health upholds the validity of the Texas Health Care Liability Act
because it allows suits based on treatment decisions only!'
The
question then arises as to how easily the lower courts will be able to
distinguish between treatment, eligibility, and mixed decisions.
193. Id. at 893.
194. Id. at 891.
195. Id. at 893.
196. Id. at 894-95 (Nigro, J., concurring) (citing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d
350,358 (3d Cir. 1995), 516 U.S. 1009 (1995)).
197. See id.
198. Mariner, supra note 6, at 595.
199. Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089,1091 (Pa. 2001).
200. Id. at 1096.

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citing TEX. CIr.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
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Due to the difficulty in distinguishing between the types of decisionmaking, HMOs might easily evade state law by characterizing their
decisions as strictly eligibility decisions. In these cases, a plaintiff's claim
would not survive ERISA preemption.
Despite this difficulty in distinguishing between treatment and
eligibility decisions, the distinction between these two types of decisions
is valid and fulfills policy goals. For instance, physicians should make
treatment decisions, and health care plans should make eligibility
decisions. Unfortunately, most disputes arise when there is confusion
over what decision is made and who makes it. Thus, the debate over the
type of decision will arise frequently and further ERISA preemption
confusion. Finally, it remains unclear how courts will treat the status of
"mixed" decisions. In Pappas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court treated
all "mixed" decisions as subject to tort liability under state law.'
In
contrast, the Fifth Circuit in CorporateHealth seemed unwilling to make
5
that conclusion upon its review of Pegram.2
Thus, conflict between the
courts as to how to treat mixed decisions will no doubt continue in the
future and prolong the debate over the scope of ERISA preemption.O
Further, with no independent review provision, plaintiffs will be
discouraged from seeking an internal review of an adverse benefits
determination. Internal reviews seem unacceptable because it appears
unlikely that review boards could remain unbiased if the boards were
employed by the managed care entity. Cost conscious decision making
would likely taint the objective analysis that is necessary in evaluating
patient needs.
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning with respect to the independent review
provisions seemed to follow a clearer path. In Travelers, the Supreme
Court stated that ERISA "does not go about protecting plan
participants and their beneficiaries by requiring employers to provide
any given set of minimum benefits."' By forcing health care entities to
comply with an independent review board, the Illinois and Texas
204. See Pappas,768 A.2d at 1095.
205. See id. at 1097 (Saylor, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that "other courts have
been more circumspect concerning the implications of Pegram 1I in relation to conflict
preemption pursuant to ERISA." Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing Corporate Health Ins.,
Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 643-44 (5th Cir. 2000) ("stating that 'we do not read
Pegram to entail that every conceivable state law claim survives preemption so long as it is
based on a mixed question of eligibility and treatment, and [our own precedent] held
otherwise"') (alteration in original)).
206. See id.
207. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 651 (1995).

2001]

CHIPPINGAWAY AT THE ERISA SHIELD

statutes can indirectly require them to provide certain benefits. Outside
personnel will be in a position to determine how a particular managed
care entity should interpret their company contracts and policies. This
interpretation clearly "relates to" the administration of an ERISA plan
and thus should be preempted.
Given the problems that ERISA causes for the inception of
independent review action, as well as the confusion surrounding
treatment and eligibility decision making, it seems likely that legislation
may be the only clear-cut way to solving this judicial conflict. Health
care plans are concerned about increased litigation that may arise if
patients are allowed to sue their HMOs under a cause of action based
on a denial of treatment.'n Litigation costs in this area will be lessened
if consumers are given a chance to first seek independent review. In
order to provide independent review, it is up to Congress to amend
ERISA.
VI. PRESSURE ON CONGRESS TO AMEND ERISA

Congress attempted unsuccessfully in the last two terms to enact a
law that would amend ERISA and give individuals more legal recourse
against adverse health plan decision making.20 In January 1998, in his
State of the Union address, President Clinton spoke about a proposed
Patients' Bill of Rights that would cure some of the abuses associated
with managed care. ° This proposal was a result of a commission
appointed by President Clinton nearly ten months prior, which was
formed to examine ways to protect people in the health care market.2
While the commission was unsure of what type of legislation, if any, was
needed, the President and members of Congress were ready to generate
legislative drafts"
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, neither the
Democrats nor the Republicans produced versions 21of the Patients' Bill
of Rights that resembled the commission's proposals 1
The Democratic version extended the commission's consumer
protections, while the Republican version offered much narrower

208. See infra note 223.
209. See, e.g., infra note 213 and accompanying text.
210. Tiffany F. Theodos, Note, The Patients' Bill of Rights: Women's Rights Under
Managed Care and ERISA Preemption, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 89 (2000).
211. David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong With a Patient Bill of

Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221,231 (2000).
212. Id. at 232.
213. Id. at 233.
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patient protection.2" During both the 105th Congress and the 106th
Congress, Republican and Democratic versions were proposed but not
accepted by majorities in both houses of Congress. 5' In July 1999, the
Senate passed, by a vote of fifty-three to forty-seven, a Republican
version that regulated HMOs and insurance companies.
Later that
year in October, a broader Democratic bill passed in the House by a
vote of 275 to 151 with sixty-eight Republican votes."'
Additional versions were proposed in the final quarter of 2000. Two
Democrats, Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Thomas Daschle,
introduced the Patients' Bill of Rights Act in the Senate on September
15, 2000.218 This legislation would have amended ERISA and allowed

state law claims for personal injury or wrongful death, which arise from
2 9
health care plan decisions that are currently preempted by ERISA.
The legislation further required that health care plans provide an
independent appeal mechanism outside the industry for those
individuals seeking to appeal a denial of benefits.'m On November 3,
2000, Republican Representative John Shadegg sponsored the Common
Sense Patients' Bill of Rights2' This legislation provided for an internal
appeals mechanism but did not specifically abrogate the ERISA
provisions that preempt certain state law claims resulting from the
m
denial of benefits.=
There are valid concerns on both sides of the debate regarding to
what extent some version of the Patients' Bill of Rights should amend
ERISA. Managed care entities argue that health care costs will increase
with the corresponding increase in litigation that could arise when the
ERISA shield goes down.'m During the 106th Congress, Republicans
talked about small businesses that would no longer be able to afford
health insurance coverage, while Democrats presented daily stories that
detailed the horrors of the managed care system. 4 With a new
214. Id.
215. Theodos, supra note 210, at 89 & n.4.
216. The 43rd President: What They Did; A Survey of the Voting Record of the 106th
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at 48.
217. Id.
218. Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 3058, 106th Cong. (2000).
219. Id. § 302(a).
220. Id. §§ 102,301.
221. Common Sense Patients' Bill of Rights Act, H.R. 5628, 106th Cong. (2000).
222. Id. § 121.
223. Theodos, supra note 210, at 105. Despite this concern, only a few such malpractice
suits have been filed in Texas since the law was enacted. See Johnson, supra note 26.
224. Hyman, supra note 211, at 237-38.
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President and a new Congress, bipartisan support for a Patients' Bill of
Rights may be building.'
By late June 2001, debates over the Patients' Bill of Rights were
numerous and support crossed party lines. Democratic Senators
Kennedy and Edwards joined with Republican Senator John McCain to
co-sponsor a bill that gave consumers with health insurance better
access to care and additional recourse for adverse decisions. "6 More
specifically,
[t]he bill would let patients visit emergency rooms, pediatricians
and obstetrician-gynecologists without needing permission. It
would promise patients access to experimental treatments and let
those who are pregnant or seriously ill keep the same doctor
temporarily, even if the doctor is dropped from their health plan.
It also would cover all Americans, except in states that can prove
to federal officials that they offered "substantially equivalent"
protections under their own laws.27
With respect to the most contested point, the consumers' right to sue
their health plans, this bill would also allow patients to appeal to outside
appeal boards and bring some, but not all, suits in state court.2 This
Senate version also permitted individuals to collect more money

damages in state and federal court. "9 Following a compromise that
225. Robert Pear, Bush to Back States' Laws on Rights for Patients,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,

2001, at 30. President Bush was quoted as saying, "'I do support a national patients' bill of
rights .... As a matter of fact, I brought Republicans and Democrats together to do just that
in the state of Texas.'" Id. The Clinton administration issued regulations late in 2000 in order
to soften disappointment related to the failed passage of the Patients' Bill of Rights. See New
Rules Order Faster Decisions on Workers' Health Care Claims, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,

Nov. 21, 2000, at 2A. These regulations quicken the claims and appeals process related to
health care coverage. Id They are the first such regulations since the passage of ERISA in
1974. Id. The regulations go into effect on January 1, 2002, and the managed care industry
has said that it will not attempt to have the regulations overturned. Id. Unlike the proposed
Patients' Bill of Rights, these regulations keep the claims and appeals process a function of
the health care provider rather than creating an independent process. Id. Upon taking office,
President Bush delayed the implementation of these regulations. See Ellen M. Yackin, HHS
Issues

11th

Hour

Pro-Consumer

Federal

Medicaid

Regulations,

at

http://www.gulpny.org/Legal*%20Services%2OJournaLSJ%20March%20200lMmedicaid2.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2001). It is unclear whether these regulations will ever be put into effect.

Id.

226. Helen Dewar & Amy Goldstein, Patients' Rights Debate Opens on Angry Note;
Senate Republicans Delay Action on Bill, WASH. POST, June 20,2001, at A4.

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. The bill "would allow patients to recover up to $5 million in civil penalties in
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protected most employers from lawsuits, the bill passed in the Senate by
a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-six.'
President Bush opposed the Senate bill, explaining that he was
against legislation that would lead to expensive and excessive
litigation."' While he wanted consumers to have the right to sue their
HMOs, President Bush supported a far more limited right for patient
suits."2 This belief was reflected in the House bill that passed, which
Bush supported after the addition of a last minute amendment.23

In

fact, the House and Senate bills were quite similar and significantly
differed only in the liability provisions.- Nonetheless, negotiations
between the House and the Senate may be strained and difficult to
successfully complete by the end of the year. 5
Despite Congress's inability to pass this legislation, managed care
entities have made changes due to public pressure. As a result, some
observers of the health care industry question whether a Patients' Bill of

Rights will make a visible impact.2

Since the issues covered in both the

federal court, but sets no limits on damages for economic loss or pain and suffering. Patients
could recover damages in state courts up to the limits set by state law." Robin Toner, At
Center of Senate Battle, a Lawyer and a Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,2001, at A21.
230. See Robert Pear, Bush Faces Defeat on Patients' Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2001, at A16; Robert Pear, "House Approves Deal with Bush" on Suing HMOs, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2001, at A16 [hereinafter Pear, House Approves Deal].
231. Dan Balz & John F. Harris, For Bush, Losing the Initiative on Patients' Rights,
WASH. POST, July 23, 2001, at A01. The concern over excessive litigation is not supported in
states that have already adopted their own versions of the Patients' Bill of Rights. See The
Right Patients'Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,2001, at A22.
232. See Pear, House Approves Deal,supra note 230, at A16.
233. Id. Under the House bill, there are limits in state court on the amount of punitive
damages ($1.5 million) and also on damages for pain and suffering ($1.5 million). Id.
According to critics, the amendment worked out between President Bush and Republican
Representative Charlie Norwood will destroy many state laws and state court decisions that
have provided patient protection. Id.
234. Curing the Patients' Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2001, at A26.
Notwithstanding the similarity in the bills, however, the House bill also implements a number
of federal rules that would make it more difficult for patients to pursue successful suits against
their health plans. Id. Further, insurance companies will also have a lot of input in deciding
which individuals will comprise the independent review panels. Id. Also, in cases that go to
court, deference will be given to the review panel, but only when the decision of the panel
favors the HMO. Id. Finally, the House bill requires "plaintiffs to prove that an H.M.O.'s
negligence was the sole cause of harm." Id.
235. Due to the recent and tragic terrorist attacks against the United States, it is unlikely
that domestic issues like the Patients' Bill of Rights will pass in the near future. Fighting
terrorism both abroad and at home will be Congress's main objective. See generally George
F. Will, On the Health of the State, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 70.
236. See Milt Freudenheim, Five Questions for Charles B. Inlander; Patients' Rights:
What's at Stake?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, § 3, at 11.
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Senate and House bills have been stirring for a number of years, health
plans have had time to make changes. 7 For example, many plans no
longer require pre-approval for emergency room care or for women's
visits to a gynecologist or obstetrician.' Additionally, many plans have
outside review systems in place for coverage conflicts. 23' Thus, the new

law will mandate uniformity, but will not impose substantive procedural
changes for many large health care plans.24' Notwithstanding this, the
pursuance of -new claims in court could have a positive effect for
consumers, 24' since the threat of litigation may encourage managed care
organizations "to approve more care and to pay [for] more claims. 2 42
VII. CONCLUSION

In the vast majority of circumstances, managed care entities provide
positive treatment results at a reduced cost to the consumer. Tragic
circumstances occur, however, in all industries, and the medical industry
is no exception. There is no convincing reason for withholding from
ERISA health plan participants remedies for harms that are available to
all other health care consumers.
The Texas Health Care Liability Act is one state's response to this
injustice.
The liability portion of the Act restricts claims to
circumstances in which the managed care entity engages in treatment
decisions.
In practice, whether or not such decisions will be
distinguishable from eligibility and mixed decisions is questionable.
Further, the independent review provisions, crucial in the eyes of
consumers who distrust their health insurance plans, were held
preempted by ERISA. While the Supreme Court has relaxed its
preemption analysis, it seems unlikely that any independent review
provisions will withstand the current version of ERISA.
Such
independent review board decisions are too intricately related to
eligibility decisions made by health plan administrators and thus remain
237. Id. States have also done their part in filling in where Congress has failed to pass
anything in the last few years. See Robert Pear, States Dismayed by FederalBills on Patient
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,2001, at Al. For example, "[florty states ...guarantee patients
an independent medical review if they are denied [medical care]." Id. Additionally, ten
states have laws that enable patients "to sue [their] health plans for damages caused by the
delay or denial of care." Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Robert Pear, Matters of Law, and Semantics, In Health Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4,2001, at Al.
242. Id.
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preempted by ERISA. There is no question that ERISA fulfills
important policy objectives related to pension plans and operational
uniformity for national employers. Notwithstanding this, however, it is
crucial that Congress re-examine policy objectives and amend ERISA in
order to lessen its impact on health care consumers.
The medical industry enjoys a unique place in people's lives. Unlike
other industries, everyone is forced to be a direct participant in it.
Further, wrong decisions in the medical industry can result in death or
serious injury rather than just financial or property loss. Thus, there is
more public outcry when its procedures or framework is flawed.
Perhaps the impact of some incorrect decisions can be prevented
through independent review boards, which place patient care above cost
efficiency. Finally, managed care entities must be held accountable for
incorrect eligibility decisions. Where there is no liability for errors,
ERISA plans have a financial incentive to deny care.243 The failure to
restrain this financial incentive with liability is a consumer concern. 2'
ERISA prevents this concern from being addressed even though
managed care entities should be motivated to be patient care centers
first and cost efficient organizations second.
At the time of printing, it was unclear whether or not Congress
would be able to successfully negotiate a compromise between the
House and Senate bills. With all of the efforts that have gone into
constructing a Patients' Bill of Rights, as well as the widespread
confusion that exists in state and federal courts, if a compromise could
be reached, it would be a satisfying conclusion to many years of debate.
A compromise could also represent the first chapter towards additional
health care reform. Despite all the positive effects that could result
from a Patients' Bill of Rights, it still will ultimately fail in one respect;
the Patients' Bill of Rights will only have an impact on people that have
health insurance. 245
A Patients' Bill of Rights leaves out forty-three million Americans
that have no health insurance. 246 Additionally, it does not enlarge
Medicare or Medicaid nor does it assist the Children's Health Insurance
Program or provide tax breaks to individuals who need to purchase

243. Mariner, supra note 6, at 595; see also HARRIS, supra note 14, at 285.
244. Mariner, supra note 6, at 595.
245. See Freudenheim, supra note 236.
A Patients' Bill of Rights will affect
approximately 180 million people who have private health insurance. Robert Pear, Shield is
Sought for Employers Under Patients'Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,2001, at A17.
246. Id.
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health insurance.2 7 It is very important that managed care organizations
be held responsible for decisions that negatively impact patients.
Nonetheless, the debate cannot end there; discussion must continue
over how to improve the quality of health care as well as how to ensure
that all Americans have access to quality care that is rightfully theirs.2'
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